Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND SUBSTANTIVE SIGNIFICANCE

NOTE: This is a more complete version of these two sections appearing in print.

Alternative Explanations

With our initial results in hand, we test our dependence network explanation against several alternative explanations that focus on substantive reasons for committing to the ICC and alternatives that examine other kinds of international networks. We include the variables that were significant in Kelley's (2007) study of ICC ratification, except for her measure of likeminded states, which consists of the group of states who announced in July 2002 that they strongly supported the statute. We prefer not to use stated support for ratification, in a period when many of those states had already ratified the statute, as a predictor of ratification.

Moravcsik argued that the primary proponents of binding international human rights institutions are the governments of newly established or unstable democracies and specifically suggested that his theory was applicable to the ICC (2000:245). In particular, he argued that governments of newly established or unstable democracies are the most likely to support strong human rights institutions because they fear a return to authoritarian rule and are seeking guarantees against such reversals. In this logic, established democracies offer only lukewarm support for binding international human rights treaties because the costs of reduced sovereignty outweigh the benefits of the commitment. Additionally, authoritarian governments will not support international human rights institutions for obvious reasons. We use the Polity data to create a measure of *New Democracy*.

While international institutions offer benefits, they also create costs that vary from one state to the next in systematic ways. Following Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006), we identify three types of costs: policy change, unintended consequences, and limited flexibility. Policy change costs occur when new international commitments require changes in domestic policies. The larger those changes, the less likely a state is to ratify a treaty (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Hathaway 2003; Vreeland 2008; Simmons 2009). In particular, we expect that countries with high levels of democracy and low levels of human rights abuse are more likely to commit sooner. We have already included level of democracy with the *Polity Score*. Human rights abuse is measured by the *Physical Integrity Rights Index* and by the *Empowerment Rights Index*, both compiled by Cingranelli and Richards (2005).[1] As we are worried about simultaneity in the human rights scale with signing and ratification, we lag those measures.[2]

A second kind of cost is the risk that international commitments will be used in unintended ways (see Hawkins 2002), yet even unintended consequences can be anticipated by calculating rough probabilities. States with a *Common Law Legal System* have less ability to control the ways in which domestic judges utilize international agreements and hence have higher possible unintended consequences (Simmons 2009). Resource-poor states, measured with the natural logarithm of real *GDP*, cannot protect themselves as easily from being targeted by international institutions and hence face higher possible unintended consequences.[3] States with higher levels

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[1] We also tested for the effect of *Rule of Law*, which Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006) found affected whether states commit to the Convention Against Torture and Kelley (2007) found negatively affected ICC ratification. It was not significant, nor was a variable for a *Leftist Executive*. (Their inclusion did not affect any other results.)

[2] If human rights treaties cause compliance, then the (monthly) variable of signing and/or ratification will affect the (annual) variable of human rights abuse. Thus, to avoid state dependence (Tuma and Hannan 1984) we lag the human rights variable by one year.

[3] *GDP* may also proxy for the cost that states contribute to international collective action generally and to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda specifically. Following Keohane (1984) and (Scheffer 1999:13), the ICC may reduce the transaction costs of repeatedly addressing and resolving collective problems. The expected sign on *GDP* is the same.

of *Forces Abroad* also face higher possibilities of unintended consequences.[4]

Third, some states face more security threats or economic problems than others and hence are likely to pay a greater price for committing to policies that tie their hands. Substantial evidence exists to suggest that governments abuse human rights when it helps them achieve goals like power and wealth (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 2000; Cardenas 2007). Governments are most likely to benefit from human rights abuse, and thus be reluctant to commit to the ICC, when they face significant security threats. We measure flexibility costs by examining two different kinds of threats that might lead states to abuse human rights: interstate *Military Disputes*; and internal unrest and civil war, *Political Stability,* using the World Bank's index of "political stability," where higher numbers indicate lower threats of violence.

Turning from the direct costs and benefits of the ICC, a variety of theorists have advanced the argument that states share understandings, values and beliefs and that those understandings constitute state behavior. As particular beliefs become part of the set of shared understandings among states, states begin to act in ways that reflect those understandings. This argument is often applied at a global level to all states that share identities *as* states. We follow Cole's (2005) measure of "embeddedness" of the state in international society by measuring the total number of IOs with which a state is affiliated.[5]

The argument of shared understandings can also be applied to groups of states. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:891) have argued that "There is general agreement on the definition of a norm as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity." In this view, norms—including human rights norms—are likely to be associated with particular state identities. In the

[4] Since *Forces Abroad* is highly skewed, we take the natural logarithm. The coefficient is insignificant for the linear scale on both signing and ratifying once the outlier—the U.S.—is removed. Removing the U.S. makes no qualitative difference in the logarithmic scale.
[5] INGO and IO membership is highly correlated.

same vein, Simmons et al. (2006:801) note that "sociocultural linkages (common language, history, religion, and so on) may contribute to 'psychological proximity' among nations. Indeed, many cross-national analyses of diffusion find significant effects of cultural similarities. . . ." Again, while there may be uncertainty about the particular causal mechanism, the general hypothesis emerging from this theoretical reasoning is that states who share particular sociocultural linkages related to identity are likely to also share similar practices, especially on normatively related issues like human rights.

Our results for *Regional Trends* are suggestive. We test this possible association explicitly by examining colonial heritage, language (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007) and "civilization" (Huntington 1996). For each state, we calculate the percentage of states within its identity group that has signed or ratified the ICC (always leaving out the commitment level of the state whose commitment we wish to explain).

Some domestic institutions make signing and ratifying treaties easier or more difficult. We incorporate this by noting whether the country has a *Presidential System* or not. Because presidents alone can sign international agreements but usually require the consent of the legislature to ratify, we expect presidential systems will sign more quickly and will be slower to ratify.[6]

Finally, states might support new international human rights institutions because they have principled commitments to promoting human rights (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). As one possible proxy for this, we examine (the natural logarithm of) the total *Voluntary Contributions* of each state (as a percentage of their GDP) to the three international tribunals in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. Voluntary contributions consist of the money donated by states over and above their yearly UN budget assessments. All three tribunals have relied to varying degrees

[6] We also examined whether bicameral systems affected signing or ratifying. They do not.

on voluntary contributions; for its first years, for example, the Sierra Leone Tribunal relied exclusively on voluntary contributions. To us this seems a good proxy because it measures costly state behavior on behalf of institutions that are similar to the ICC and hence should pick up principled commitments to human rights enforcement. Our measures of domestic policy change costs could also be considered measures of principled commitments to human rights norms: the more a state respects democracy and human rights domestically, the more committed it is to human rights principles. These measures of principles are arguably not as good as voluntary contributions because commitment to domestic human rights does not imply commitment to international enforcement. However, they do reflect general dedication to human rights (Kelley 2007).[7]

In Tables 2 and 3, we assess the hypotheses through the discrete-time event history model. Table 2 displays the results for countries signing the ICC Statute; Table 3 displays the results for ratifying. We expect the coefficients of the variables to be positive, except for *Military Disputes*, *Forces Abroad*, and *Common Law Legal System* (and *Presidential System* for ratifying).

We present several specifications using different combinations of control variables and operationalizations of dependence networks. The first three columns (for both Tables 2 and 3) use the three separate dependence network variables: *Trade*, *IO*, and *Security Network*. The last three columns use the *Dependence Network Index.* The first column in Tables 2 and 3 reproduces for comparison the results from (column 5 of) Table 1 including all three dependence networks and the control variables of *Polity Score* and *Regional Trends* (a "basic" specification). The third column in Tables 2 and 3 includes all of the control variables discussed above, along with the variables in the first column (a "full" specification). And the second column in Tables 2 and 3 are a "reduced" specification that includes variables that are statistically significant (or close to

[7] Other variables we tried, but were not significant include GDP/capita and socialist law legal systems.

it) in a reduced or full specification. Equivalent specifications for the index variable are in the last three columns.

The coefficients of the dependence network variables, whether separately or in the index, are qualitatively similar across all three specifications. We are thus confident that our results are robust. Most of the other independent variables shown in Table 2 and 3 are neither statistically nor substantively significant. Since we have multiple measures of each category, one might suspect multicollinearity is hiding individual significance. However, a joint significance test fails to reject the hypothesis that the additional variables in the full specification have no effect.[8]

There is little support for the benefits lock-in logic. *New Democracy* is not statistically significant for signing or ratifying.[9] Thus, the evidence for lock-in logic is not strong. There is also generally little support for the costs variables. Level of democracy (a policy change cost) is a significant predictor of signing and ratification in basic models, but usually fails to achieve significance once other variables are brought into those models. Respect for empowerment rights (also a policy change cost) is a significant predictor for signing using the network index in the reduced model, and close to significance in other specifications. Other costs variables are either statistically insignificant or in the wrong direction.[10]

Different identity-oriented variables matter for signing and ratifying. For both signing and

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[8] The variables added to the basic model to get the restricted model are jointly significant. In addition, the restricted model is the "best fitting model" among presented models by the Akaike information criterion.
[9] Other operationalizations of the lock-in logic—such as *Unstable Democracy* × *Polity Score* and *Regime Volatility* × *Polity Score*—also show no support: The coefficients are the wrong sign and/or statistically insignificant.
[10] Following Hathaway's (2003) work on democracy and human rights, the effect of improving human rights should be positive for democracies, and negative for dictatorships. We included interaction terms between *Polity* and *Physical Rights*, and *Polity and Empowerment Rights*. For both signing and ratifying, the interaction term for *Physical Rights* is statistically insignificant while the interaction term for *Empowerment Rights* is negative: there is no effect of *Empowerment Rights* for democracies, and a positive effect for autocracies, contrary to Hathaway's hypothesis.

ratifying, *Number of IGOs* is statistically significant.[11] For signing, *Civilization* is statistically significant. For ratifying, *Colonial* is statistically significant, though it is the wrong sign. *Presidential System* is not statistically significant for signing or ratifying.[12]

Substantive Significance

To assess the substantive significance of different variables, we compare the mean probability of signing or ratifying, changing one independent variable at a time (see Table 4). We use the "reduced" specification that includes the separate dependence network variables and statistically significant control variables (column 2 from Tables 2 and 3). As the mean probability changes over time, we make our comparisons at the end of the signing period (December 2000) for signing and at the end of our observation period (December 2004) for ratifying. Although some countries will have signed or ratified much earlier, choosing an earlier time yields qualitatively similar results. Starting with a baseline case, we use the coefficients estimated from the event history models to calculate how the mean probability of commitment changes as we increase an independent variable. By comparing changes in the mean probability within a type of commitment, we can assess the relative substantive significance of the variables.

As a baseline, we set each independent variable to its median value (or 50th percentile).[13] We then change each variable to its 90th percentile value one at a time and recalculate the mean probability.[14] We also report the change in the mean probability and the 95% confidence interval

[11] An auxiliary analysis indicates that Europe is driving the result for *Number of IGOs:* when European states are dropped from the analysis, *Number of IGOs* is no longer statistically significant and its substantive significance is halved.
[12] In addition, there is no difference in the lag length for presidential vs. non-presidential countries.
[13] We allow the dependence network, identity, and regional scores to vary across time, choosing the mean value in each month. We also allow the duration dependence variables—months-at-risk and the cubic spline variables—to vary across time.
[14] In a normal distribution, moving from the 50th percentile to the 90th percentile would be equivalent to adding 1.3 standard deviations. For the network, identity, and regional variables, we move to the 90th percentile in each month. We average the values across time to report the change noted in the table.

for that change. For ease of comparison, we order the independent variables from the strongest in the hypothesized direction at the top to the strongest against the hypothesized direction at the bottom, with variables with no effect in the middle. In addition, for ease of interpretation, we convert logged values back to their original values.[15]

The changes in the mean probability of signing the ICC are in top half of Table 4. The independent variables that cause the greatest statistically significant changes in the signing probability in the hypothesized direction are *Number of IGOs* and *Civilization*. Moving from a baseline country which has 58 IGO memberships to a country which has 84 IGO memberships increases the probability of signing from 0.58 to 0.80, an increase of 0.21. Moving from a baseline country where 21% of countries within the same "civilization" have signed the ICC to a country where 57% of countries within the same civilization have signed increases the probability of signing by 0.18. The *Empowerment Rights* variable induces large changes, but its 95% confidence interval includes zero, and is therefore not statistically significant. *IO Network* has a statistically significant change, but it is substantively small, even though the coefficient is large: an increase of 0.04. This is because *IO Network* does not change much, on average. The other substantively important variables are not in the hypothesized direction and/or are statistically insignificant.

The changes in the mean probability of ratifying the ICC are in the bottom half of Table 4. The independent variable that induces the greatest statistically significant change in the ratifying probability is *Trade Network*. Moving from a baseline country where 23% of (weighted) trade network partners have ratified the ICC to a country where 45% of (weighted) trade network partners have ratified increases the probability of ratifying from 0.44 to 0.68, or about 0.24.

[15] We used the Clarify program, which we augmented to include the complementary log-log function, to produce the distributions of the change in mean probability (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).

Moving from a baseline country which has 60 IGO memberships to a country which has 86 IGO memberships increases the probability of ratifying by 0.19. Similar to signing, a country with the largest *Empowerment Rights* has a higher probability of ratifying (0.26 more); and *Polity Score* induces a large increase of 0.22. However, for both *Empowerment Rights* and *Polity Score* the 95% confidence interval includes zero and therefore is not statistically significant. Both *Security Network* and *Regional Trends* increase the probability of ratifying, but neither are statistically nor substantively significant. *Colonial*, *GDP,* and *IO Network* all have some substantive strength, but either are not statistically significant or in the wrong direction or both.

If we use the *Network Index* instead of its separate component parts, increasing the *Network Index* from the median to the 90th percentile has a (statistically significant) substantive effect on both signing and ratifying similar to the variables with large effects (e.g. *Number of IGOs*).

DATA APPENDIX

Signature: Year that a state signed or acceded to the ICC. *Source*: International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html, accessed 26 August 2005. Monthly data.

Ratification/Accession: Year that a state ratified or acceded to the ICC. *Source*: International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html, accessed 26 August 2005. Monthly data.

Security Network: Weighted proportion of military partners that have signed or ratified the ICC. A military partner exists for state A if A has a defense treaty with state B. Partners are weighted by their Composite Index of National Capabilities from the Correlates of War dataset, which includes "total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditures." *Source*: Leeds et al. 2002, updated to 2004; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972: National Material Capabilities, version 3.0. Converted to monthly data.

Trade Network: Weighted proportion of trade partners that have signed or ratified the ICC. A trade partner exists for state A if A imports from or exports to state B. The partner is weighted by the sum of imports from and exports to state B divided by the total imports and exports of state A. If imports to State A from State B were reported missing then we used the reported exports from State B to State A multiplied by 1.1 (the standard CIF/FOB adjustment), if such data were available, and similarly for exports (divided by 1.1). *Source***:** International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, July 2005. Monthly data.

International Organization Network: Weighted proportion of International Organization (IO) partners that have signed or ratified the ICC. An IO partner exists for state A if A is in an IO with state B, where the IO has a significant bureaucratic apparatus whose functions are either multi-purpose, security provision, or oriented to general economic welfare. (The IOs we use are listed in Table A2 below.) For each state, we total the number of memberships it shares with every other state in all of these IOs (where the same dyad could be counted multiple times for shared memberships in multiple IOs and where the IOs include both regional and global organizations), weighted by the proportion of the UN's general budget contributed by each IO partner. *Source*: Ingram, Robinson, and Busch 2005, updated by Ingram; Various UN resolutions. Monthly data.

Network Dependence Index: Unweighted average of the Security Network, Trade Network, and International Organization Network.

Polity Score: Polity2 score, ranging from −10 to +10, where +10 is the most democratic. *Source*: Marshall and Jaggers 2004, modified by Gleditsch 2003.

Regional Trends: Proportion of states in the region that have signed or ratified the ICC. The regions are Latin America and Caribbean; sub-Saharan Africa; East Europe and Central Asia; Middle East and North Africa; South Asia; East Asia and Pacific; and rest of Europe, including United States and Canada, as defined by the World Bank.

New Democracy: Dichotomous variable coded 1 for the years in which the Polity2 score rises to 7 or above (after being below 7) in 1975 or later until the score either drops below 7 or remains at 7 or above for more than 10 years. *Source*: Marshall and Jaggers 2004, modified by Gleditsch 2003.

Physical Integrity Rights Index: The extent to which states respect physical integrity rights (disappearance, killings, political prisoners, torture), on a 0-8 scale, with 8 as the least abusive. *Source:* Cingranelli and Richards 2005.

Empowerment Rights Index: The extent to which states respect empowerment rights (free association, movement, speech, political participation, and religion), on a 0-10 scale, with 10 as the most respectful. *Source:* Cingranelli and Richards 2005.

Common Law Legal System: Legal system in which judges can create law through rulings and are not confined to statutory law. *Source*: LaPorta et al. 1999.

***ln*(GDP):** natural logarithm of real GDP in constant 1996 dollars. *Sources*: Gleditsch 2004 (years 1998-2000); World Bank 2005 (years 2001-2004).

Military Disputes: Hostility level score for each country, Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset. Hostility levels coded as follows: 0=No militarized dispute, 1=No militarized action but participant in a dispute, 2=Threat to use force, 3=Display of force, 4=Use of force, 5=War. *Source*: Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004.

Political Stability: Index measuring the lack of "likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in, government, including terrorism," taken from the World Bank's Governance Matters IV database. The estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, reported only for even years. We impute the measure for the odd years by interpolation between even years. *Source:* Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005.

***ln*(Forces Abroad):** Natural logarithm of the number of troops stationed outside of a country (plus 1). *Source*: *The Military Balance*, various years.

Colonial: Proportion of states sharing a colonial heritage that have signed or ratified the ICC. *Source*: Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007.

Language: Proportion of states sharing an official language that have signed or ratified the ICC. *Source*: Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007.

Civilization: Proportion of states sharing a civilization that have signed or ratified the ICC. *Source*: Fox 2002.

Presidential System: A system where the chief executive has veto power, or can appoint and dismiss the prime minister and dissolve parliament, taken from the Database of Political Institutions. *Source*: Beck et al. 2001.

Voluntary Contributions: Voluntary state donations (beyond any mandatory assessments) to the international tribunals for Sierra Leone (through June 30, 2004), Rwanda (through 31 Oct. 2005), and the former Yugoslavia (through 31 Oct. 2005). Each state's total donation is divided by its 2005 GDP in constant 2000 dollars to produce a percent of GDP contributed. *Source:* Various UN documents and annual reports for the Sierra Leone Court.

Number of IGOs: Number of intergovernmental organizations to which a state belongs. *Source:* Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004.

Table A1: Countries and Signature/Ratification Dates of Sample

Country	Signature	Ratification
Afghanistan	10-Feb-03	10-Feb-03
Albania	18-Jul-02	31-Jan-03
Algeria	28-Dec-00	
Angola	7-Oct-98	
Argentina	8-Jan-99	8-Feb-01
Armenia	1-Oct-99	
Australia	9-Dec-98	1-Jul-02
Austria	7-Oct-98	28-Dec-00
Azerbaijan		
Bahrain	11-Dec-00	
Bangladesh	16-Sep-99	
Belarus (Byelorussia)		
Belgium	10-Sep-98	28-Jun-00
Benin	24-Sep-99	22-Jan-02
Bhutan		
Bolivia	17-Jul-98	27-Jun-02
Bosnia-Herzegovina	17-Jul-00	11-Apr-02
Botswana	8-Sep-00	8-Sep-00
Brazil	7-Feb-00	20-Jun-02
Bulgaria	11-Feb-99	11-Apr-02
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	30-Nov-98	16-Apr-04
Burundi	13-Jan-99	21-Sep-04
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	23-Oct-00	11-Apr-02
Cameroon	17-Jul-98	
Canada	18-Dec-98	7-Jul-00
Central African Republic	7-Dec-99	3-Oct-01
Chad	20-Oct-99	
Chile	11-Sep-98	
China		
Colombia	10-Dec-98	5-Aug-02
Comoros	22-Sep-00	
Congo	17-Jul-98	3-May-04
Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire)	8-Sep-00	11-Apr-02
Costa Rica	7-Oct-98	7-Jun-01
Cote d'Ivoire	30-Nov-98	
Croatia	12-Oct-98	21-May-01
Cuba		
Cyprus	15-Oct-98	7-Mar-02
Czech Republic	13-Apr-99	
Denmark	25-Sep-98	21-Jun-01

Djibouti	7-Oct-98	5-Nov-02
Dominican Republic	8-Sep-00	
East Timor	6-Sep-02	6-Sep-02
Ecuador	7-Oct-98	5-Feb-02
Egypt	26-Dec-00	
El Salvador		
Eritrea	7-Oct-98	
Estonia	27-Dec-99	30-Jan-02
Ethiopia		
Fiji	29-Nov-99	29-Nov-99
Finland	7-Oct-98	29-Dec-00
France	18-Jul-98	9-Jun-00
Gabon	22-Dec-98	20-Sep-00
Gambia	4-Dec-98	28-Jun-02
Georgia	18-Jul-98	5-Sep-03
German Federal Republic	10-Dec-98	11-Dec-00
Ghana	18-Jul-99	20-Dec-99
Greece	18-Jul-99	15-May-02
Guatemala		
Guinea	7-Sep-00	14-Jul-03
Guinea-Bissau	12-Sep-00	
Guyana	28-Dec-00	24-Sep-04
Haiti	26-Feb-99	
Honduras	7-Oct-98	1-Jul-02
Hungary	15-Jan-99	30-Nov-01
India		
Indonesia		
Iran (Persia)	31-Dec-00	
Iraq		
Ireland	7-Oct-98	11-Apr-02
Israel	31-Dec-00	
Italy/Sardinia	18-Jul-98	26-Jul-99
Jamaica	8-Sep-00	
Japan		
Jordan	7-Oct-98	11-Apr-02
Kazakhstan	11-Aug-99	
Kenya	21-Jun-99	15-Mar-05
Korea, People's Republic of		
Korea, Republic of	8-Mar-00	13-Nov-02
Kuwait	8-Sep-00	
Kyrgyz Republic	8-Dec-98	
Laos		
Latvia	22-Apr-99	28-Jun-02

Lebanon		
Lesotho	30-Nov-98	6-Sep-00
Liberia	17-Jul-98	22-Sep-04
Libya		
Lithuania	10-Dec-98	12-May-03
Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of)	7-Oct-98	6-Mar-02
Madagascar (Malagasy)	18-Jul-98	
Malawi	2-Mar-99	19-Sep-02
Malaysia		
Maldives		
Mali	17-Jul-98	16-Aug-00
Mauritania		
Mauritius	11-Nov-98	5-Mar-02
Mexico	7-Sep-00	
Moldova	8-Sep-00	
Mongolia	29-Dec-00	11-Apr-02
Morocco	8-Sep-00	
Mozambique	28-Dec-00	
Myanmar (Burma)		
Namibia	27-Oct-98	25-Jun-02
Nepal		
Netherlands	18-Jul-98	17-Jul-01
New Zealand	7-Oct-98	7-Sep-00
Nicaragua		
Niger	17-Jul-98	11-Apr-02
Nigeria	1-Jun-00	27-Sep-01
Norway	28-Aug-98	16-Feb-00
Oman	20-Dec-00	
Pakistan		
Panama	18-Jul-98	21-Mar-02
Papua New Guinea		
Paraguay	7-Oct-98	14-May-01
Peru	7-Dec-00	10-Nov-01
Philippines	28-Dec-00	
Poland	9-Apr-99	12-Nov-01
Portugal	7-Oct-98	5-Feb-02
Qatar		
Rumania	9-Jul-99	11-Apr-02
Russia (Soviet Union)	13-Sep-00	
Rwanda		
Saudi Arabia		
Senegal	18-Jul-98	2-Feb-99

Sierra Leone	17-Oct-98	15-Sep-00
Singapore		
Slovakia	23-Dec-98	11-Apr-02
Slovenia	7-Oct-98	31-Dec-01
Somalia		
South Africa	19-Jul-98	27-Nov-00
Spain	18-Jul-98	24-Oct-00
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)		
Sudan	8-Sep-00	
Swaziland		
Sweden	7-Oct-98	28-Jun-01
Switzerland	18-Jul-01	12-Oct-01
Syria	29-Nov-00	
Tajikistan	30-Nov-98	5-May-00
Tanzania/Tanganyika	29-Dec-00	20-Aug-02
Thailand	2-Oct-00	
Togo		
Trinidad and Tobago	23-Mar-99	6-Apr-99
Tunisia		
Turkey/Ottoman Empire		
Turkmenistan		
Uganda	17-Mar-99	14-Jun-02
Ukraine	20-Jan-00	
United Arab Emirates	27-Nov-00	
United Kingdom	30-Nov-98	4-Oct-01
United States of America	31-Dec-00	
Uruguay	19-Dec-00	28-Jun-02
Uzbekistan	29-Dec-00	
Venezuela	14-Oct-98	7-Jun-00
Vietnam, Democratic Republic of		
Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen)	28-Dec-00	
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	19-Dec-00	6-Sep-01
Zambia	17-Jul-98	13-Nov-02
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	17-Jul-98	

Table A2: List of International Organizations used for IO Network

African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP Group)
ACP-EU Joint Assembly
African Export Import Bank (Afreximbank)
African Intellectual Property Organization
Afro-Malagasy Industrial Property Office
ANZUS Council
Andean Parliament
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
African Development Bank
Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Benelux Economic Union
Bank for International Settlements
Conferencia de Autoridades Cinematogrficas de Iberoamerica (CACI)
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine
Central Compensation Office of the Maghreb
Common Fund for Commodities (CFC)
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Council of Europe
Imperial War Graves Commission/Commonwealth War Graves Commission
Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec)
Danube Commission
Eurasian Patent Organization (EAPO)
European Central Bank (ECB)
Eastern Caribbean Currency Area (ECCA)
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB)
European Commission for Control of the Danube
East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM)
European Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels
European Economic Community/European Community
European Free Trade Association
Empire Marketing Board
European Patent Office (EPO)/E.P. Organization
European Payments Union
European Union (EU)
European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation/EUROCONTROL
Far East Commission
Group of Three (G-3)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Hague Conference on Private International Law
Inter-American Development Bank
Inter-American Defense Board
International Atomic Energy Agency

Inter-American High Commission
Inter-American Investment Corporation
Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (IAIGC)
Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission
Inter-American Trademark Bureau
International Arbitration Tribunal at San Jose
International Central American Office
Imperial Defense Committee
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
International Monetary Fund
International Maritime Organization (IMO)/Provisional Maritime Consultative Comm
International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO)
International Criminal Police Commission/International Criminal Police Organizat
International Patent Institute
International Seabed Authority (ISBA)
International Telecommunication Union
International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property
International Union of Pruth (River)
International Whaling Commission
Latin American Free Trade Association
Commission of the Chad Basin/Lake Chad Basin Commission
League of Arab States
League of Nations
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
Southern Common Market/MERCOSUR
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Nordic Council of Ministers
Nordic Investment Bank
Nordic Council
Pan American Union (OAS)
Organization for African Unity
Organization of Central American States
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (Organization for Economic Cooper
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Permanent Court of Arbitration
Regional African Satellite Communications Organization (RASCOM)
Reparation Commission
Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
Group of Schengen
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC)
Union conomique et mon taire Ouest africaine (UEMOA)
Union montaire de l'Afrique centrale (UMAC)
West African Monetary Union/UMOA

United Nations
Western European Union (WEU)
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Warsaw Treaty Organization
World Trade Organization (WTO)
World Tourism Organization (WTO)

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