

Online Appendix for

“A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining International Criminal Court Negotiations”

Data

Council: Support (+1), Neutrality/No comment (0), Opposition (−1) on reducing UN Security Council control of the International Criminal Court.

Prosecutor: Support (+1), Neutrality/No comment (0), Opposition (−1) on increasing the independence of the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court.

Acceptance: Support (+1), Neutrality/No comment (0), Opposition (−1) on accepting increasing jurisdiction for the International Criminal Court.

Exercise: Support (+1), Neutrality/No comment (0), Opposition (−1) on reducing preconditions to exercise jurisdiction for the International Criminal Court.

Aggregate Position: Summation of the *Council*, *Prosecutor*, *Acceptance*, and *Exercise* scores. List of all coded UN documents available from authors.

Trade Network: Weighted average of *Aggregate Position* of trade partners. A trade partner exists for state A if A imports from or exports to state B. The partner is weighted by the sum of imports from and exports to state B divided by the total imports and exports of state A. If imports to State A from State B were reported missing then we used the reported exports from State B to State A multiplied by 1.1 (the standard CIF/FOB adjustment), if such data were available, and similarly for exports (divided by 1.1).

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, July 2005.

Security Network: Weighted average of *Aggregate Position* of military partners. A military partner exists for state A if A has a defensive alliance with state B. Partners are weighted by their Composite

Index of National Capabilities from the Correlates of War dataset. *Source*: Leeds et al. 2002, Singer 1987, version 3.0.

International Organization Network: Weighted average of *Aggregate Position* of International Organization (IO) partners. An IO partner exists for state A if A is in an IO with state B, where the IO has a significant bureaucratic apparatus whose functions are either multi-purpose, security provision, or oriented to general economic welfare. For each state, we total the number of memberships it shares with every other state in all of these IOs (where the same dyad could be counted multiple times for shared memberships in multiple IOs), weighted by the proportion of the UN's general budget contributed by each IO partner. *Source*: Ingram, Robinson, and Busch 2005; Various UN resolutions.

ln(Tribunal Budgets): Natural logarithm of the assessed cost of the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals to each country in the regular scale of assessments. The regular scale constituted 50 percent of the tribunals' entire assessed budget, with the other 50 percent determined by a special peacekeeping scale. In practice, the two scales did not differ much and we use the regular scale as a proxy for the peacekeeping scale, which is extraordinarily difficult to identify for every year. *Source*: UN Resolutions A/RES/46/221, A/RES/49/19, A/RES/52/215.

New Democracy: Dichotomous variable coded 1 for the years in which the Polity2 Score rises to 7 or above (after being below 7) in 1975 or later until the score either drops below 7 or remains at 7 or above for more than 10 years. *Source*: Marshall and Jaggers 2004.

Unstable Democracy: Whether (1) or not (0) each democratic state (any state with a positive polity2 score) experienced a 3-point drop in Polity Score, 1975-2002. A gradual drop over several years and a sudden drop in one year are both included. *Source*: Marshall and Jaggers 2004.

Regime Volatility: The standard deviation of the Polity Scores for each country from 1975-2002. *Source*: Marshall and Jaggers 2004.

Polity Score: Polity2 score, ranging from -10 to 10, where 10 is the most democratic. *Source*: Marshall and Jaggers 2004.

Empowerment Rights Index: The extent to which states respect empowerment rights (free association,

movement, speech, political participation, and religion), on a 0-10 scale, with 10 as the most respectful.

Source: Cingranelli and Richards 2004.

Physical Integrity Rights Index: The extent to which states respect physical integrity rights (disappearance, killings, political prisoners, torture), on a 0-8 scale, with 8 as the least abusive. *Source:* Cingranelli and Richards 2004.

Left Party Executive: Whether (1) or not (0) the party of the chief executive is “left.” Note: 0 includes “center,” “right,” and cases that are not applicable. *Source:* Beck et al. 2001.

Common Law Judicial System: Legal system in which judges can create law through rulings and are not confined to statutory law. *Source:* LaPorta et al. 1999.

ln(GDP): Natural log of GDP, calculated at purchasing power parity in constant 1996 international dollars. *Source:* Gleditsch 2002.

Military Disputes: Militarized Interstate Dispute Score for each country. Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset. Hostility levels coded as follows: 0=No militarized dispute, 1=No militarized action but participant in a dispute, 2=Threat to use force, 3=Display of force, 4=Use of force, 5=War. *Source:* Ghosn and Palmer 2003.

State Failure Index: This measure incorporates four data sets within the “state failure” project: ethnic war, revolutionary war, adverse regime change, and genocide/politicide. For the first three data sets, we took the average magnitude measure (range 1-4) and for the fourth we took the death magnitude measure (range 1-5), with all scores above 4 converted to 4. We then took the maximum score for each state and year. This provides a measure of the extent of the domestic security threat facing states. *Source:* Goldstone et al. 2000.

ln(Forces Abroad): Natural logarithm (due to right-skewness) of number of troops stationed outside of a country. *Source:* *The Military Balance*.

ln(GDP/capita): Natural logarithm of GDP per capita, calculated at purchasing power parity in constant 1996 international dollars. *Source:* Gleditsch 2002.

Regional Trend: Average *Aggregate Position* of states in the region. The regions are Latin America and

Caribbean; sub-Saharan Africa; East Europe and Central Asia; Middle East and North Africa; South Asia; East Asia and Pacific; and rest of Europe, including United States and Canada, as defined by the World Bank.

Global Trend: Average *Aggregate Position* of all states.

Colonial Network: Average of *Aggregate Position* of states sharing a colonial heritage. *Source:* Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007.

Language Network: Average of *Aggregate Position* of states sharing an official language. *Source:* Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007.

Civilization Network: Average of *Aggregate Position* of states sharing a civilization. *Source:* Fox 2002.

Religion: Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, or other. *Source:* LaPorta et al. 1999.

***ln*(NGO):** For each country, natural logarithm (due to right-skewness) of the number of NGOs present at Rome negotiations with headquarters in that country. *Source:* Judith Kelley, personal communication.

Methodology

Robustness Checks and Other Notes

The four issues that make up the scale of the dependent variable generally move together. A factor analysis strongly suggests there is one factor in the four variables (first eigenvalue = 1.5, other eigenvalues negative). In addition, Cronbach's alpha = 0.7, which equals the accepted cut-off to be considered a scale.

We treat *Aggregate Position* as interval-level when we add the four dimensions together, and use our fixed effects and random coefficients models. We also used a random-effects ordered probit, which assumes ordinal- rather than interval-level in the dependent variable, and obtained qualitatively similar results.

A regular (or regular robust) fixed-effects model yields the same coefficients as the Arellano Robust model, but (usually) with smaller standard errors. The Arellano Robust model is thus more conservative. With only 10 time periods, panel-corrected standard errors are not appropriate. Nevertheless, PCSEs with fixed effects yields qualitatively similar results. In Stata, the Arellano robust fixed effects model is estimated by using the `areg, cluster()` command.

To estimate the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition, model we use the `xtfevd` Stata command generously provided by Plümer and Troeger. In Monte Carlo analysis, Plümer and Troeger (2007) find that slow-moving variables are best treated as invariant. In our analysis, *Common Law Legal System*, *NGO*, *Unstable Democracy*, and *Regime Volatility* are invariant variables. Following Plümer and Troeger's rule of thumb concerning within- and between-variance, we also treat *Polity Score*, *Empowerment Rights Index*, *GDP*, and *GDP/capita* as invariant variables. This affects the results for *GDP* and *GDP/capita*, which we explain in the text.

We estimate the Random Coefficients Model in R using the excellent `lme4` package of Bates and Sarkar (2007). We use a diagonal variance-covariance matrix for the random effects, which assumes that

the random effects are independent, but may have different variances. Less restrictive variance-covariance matrices did not improve model fit using the Akaike Information Criterion.

Including a time trend, or period fixed effects, does not qualitatively change the results. Such period fixed effects would pick up international events that might affect all countries, such as the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995. The results show a substantial increase in support of a strong ICC over time, although no real differences between 1995 and 1996.

A Hausman test rejects a random effects (i.e. random intercept) model compared to a fixed effects model ($p < 0.0001$). The fixed effects are jointly significant to many decimal places.

Although we are using the Polity scores to produce multiple measures, there is no significant multicollinearity in the following analysis. The highest variance inflation factor (VIF) is under 6; the rule-of-thumb for concern is for $VIF > 10$.

Though they are not reported in the manuscript, the spread of the random coefficients for each variable may be of interest. For most variables, the standard deviation of the distribution of coefficients is small relative to the mean coefficient, which is reported. There are two exceptions: *Tribunal Cost* and *Security Network*. The interpretation of this in the context of the Random Coefficients model is that for some countries *Tribunal Cost* or *Security Network* matters a lot. For other countries, it does not matter at all, or it even matters in the opposite direction.

The reported analysis is only estimating short-term change. Longer-run changes (over a few time periods) would be larger as a result of accumulation and mutually-reinforcing feedback loops (Franzese and Hays 2008).

To see if states that were very dependent on the United States acted differently, we ran the analysis including only those states that have over 15% of their trade with the United States. The results were qualitatively similar. (Using higher percentages does not include enough cases for meaningful analysis.)

Construction of Figure 1

To decide which model to use in Figure 1, we use the Akaike Information Criterion, which shows that both fixed effects models outperform the Random Coefficients model. In addition, the Vector Decomposition model allows us to compare the effects of invariant independent variables. For independent variables that have multiplicative terms, we move from (mean $-$ 1 s.d.) to (mean $+$ 1 s.d.). For variables that do not have multiplicative terms, any 2 s.d. shift yields the same results. Taking into account the discrete nature of some variables by shifting from the 50th to the 90th percentile yields similar results.

Table A shows how Figure 1 was constructed.

Table A: Predicted Change in Aggregate Position on Increasing Strength of the ICC

Independent Variable	Expected Effect	Change in Independent Variable	Predicted Change in Position	95% Confidence Interval of Change
Civilization Network	+	+1.34	+0.54	(0.31, 0.77)
Trade Network	+	+1.80	+0.45	(0.27, 0.63)
Tribunal Budget (in \$ millions)	+	+0.95	+0.42	(0.25, 0.60)
Empowerment Rights Index	+	+6.48	+0.40	(0.16, 0.64)
New Democracy	+	+0.75	+0.36	(0.21, 0.52)
Catholic Country	+	+0.91	+0.36	(0.19, 0.54)
Military Disputes	-	+3.73	+0.30	(0.16, 0.44)
Language Network	+	+1.42	+0.27	(0.10, 0.43)
Physical Integrity Rights Index	+	+4.78	+0.26	(0.07, 0.45)
GDP/capital (in \$10,000)	+	+1.10	+0.19	(-0.04, 0.42)
Leftist Executive	+	+0.94	+0.17	(0.04, 0.30)
Forces Abroad (in 1000s)	-	+0.99	+0.14	(-0.03, 0.31)
Unstable Democracy	+	+0.82	+0.12 ^a	(-0.04, 0.27)
Muslim Country	-	+0.85	+0.09	(-0.07, 0.25)
Common Law Legal System	-	+0.90	+0.04	(-0.11, 0.18)
Regional Trend	+	+1.40	+0.03	(-0.23, 0.29)
International Organizations Network	+	+1.16	-0.04	(-0.27, 0.19)
Military Network	+	+0.15	-0.05	(-0.18, 0.09)
Protestant Country	+	+0.57	-0.07	(-0.21, 0.07)
Colonization Network	+	+0.87	-0.13	(-0.27, 0.01)
State Failure	-	+2.21	-0.19	(-0.34, -0.04)
Polity Score	+	+13.74	-0.20 ^a	(-0.48, 0.09)
Global Trend	+	+1.03	-0.27	(-0.53, -0.01)
Regime Volatility	+	+5.42	-0.27 ^a	(-0.46, -0.09)
Other: NGO	+	+3.08	-0.34 ^b	(-0.52, -0.16)
Cost: GDP (in 100 billions of dollars)	+	+2.56	-0.58	(-0.83, -0.33)

Notes: Predicted change in position is calculated from the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition coefficients in Table 1. The change in the independent variable is two standard deviations. We order the variables from the largest positive to the largest negative predicted changes, with variables with no effect in the middle. Where the confidence interval includes zero, the predicted effect is not statistically significant different than zero at a 0.05 level. In addition, we convert logged values back to their original values.

Example: Increasing a country's *Civilization Network* by 1.34 increases that country's *Aggregate Position* by 0.54, with a 95% confidence interval of (0.31, 0.77).,

^a Includes effects of change on constitutive and multiplicative terms.

^b Effect of NGO disappears when United States is dropped from the data set.

References for Online Appendix

- Bates, Douglas, and Deepayan Sarkar. 2007. lme4: Linear mixed-effects models using S4 classes. R package version 0.99875-0.
- Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." *World Bank Economic Review* 15(1): 165-176.
- Cingranelli, David L. and David L. Richards. 2005. The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, Version 2005.10.12. At <http://www.humanrightsdata.org>, accessed 21 November 2005.
- Fox, Jonathan. 2002. "Ethnic minorities and the clash of civilizations: a quantitative analysis of Huntington's thesis." *British Journal of Political Science* 32: 415-434.
- Franzese, Robert C., Jr, and Jude C. Hays. 2008. "Interdependence in Comparative Politics: Substance, Theory, Empirics, Substance." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4/5): 742-80.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. "Expanded Trade and GDP Data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(5): 712-24.
- Ghosn, Faten, and Glenn Palmer. 2003. Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0. Online: <http://cow2.la.psu.edu>, accessed June 1, 2004.
- Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67.
- Goldstone, Jack A., Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc A. Levy, Monty G. Marshall, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Colin H. Kahl, Pamela T. Surko, John C. Ulfelder, and Alan N. Unger. In consultation with Matthew Christenson, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Daniel C. Esty, and Thomas M. Parris. 2000. *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings*. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 30 September 2000.
- Ingram, Paul, Jeffrey Robinson, and Marc L. Busch. 2005. "The Intergovernmental Network of World Trade: IGO Connectedness, Governance, and Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 111(3): 824-858. Updated by Ingram.
- International Monetary Fund. 2005. Direction of Trade Statistics, July.
- LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1999. "The Quality of Government." *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization* 15(1): 222-279.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944." *International Interactions* 28: 237-260. Updated to 2004 at Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project, version 3.0, <http://atop.rice.edu/>, accessed 17 November 2005.
- Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2004. Polity IV Dataset. [Computer file; version p4v2003]

College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. Available at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/>, accessed 21 November 2005.

The Military Balance. Various years. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Brassey's.

Plümper, Thomas and Vera E. Troeger. 2007. "Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects." *Political Analysis* 15(2): 124-139.

Singer, J. David. 1987. "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985." *International Interactions*, 14: 115-32.