Political Science 410/430

Capstone Seminar in American Politics/Public Policy:

Money in Politics

Course Syllabus

Winter 2003

TR 8:00 - 9:15 a.m. in 280 SWKT

Instructor: Jay Goodliffe

Office: 752 SWKT

Office Hours: TR 2 - 3 p.m., or by appointment

Phone: 422-9136

e-mail: goodliffe@byu.edu

Contents:

Home Page

Office Hours

Prerequisites

Objectives

Approach

Requirements

Expectations

Academic Honesty and Plagiarism

Other Notes

Readings

Schedule

Home Page

The home page for Political Science 410/430 is http://fhss.byu.edu/polsci/Goodliffe/410/. Check the home page often for announcements, corrections, etc.

Office Hours

I will hold office hours on Tuesday and Thursday 2-3 p.m. I am also available at most other times if you make arrangements with me. I encourage you to come by for any reason whatsoever.

You should check your email regularly (as well as the class web page) for updates, announcements, corrections, etc. You are responsible for any announcements made in class even if you did not attend. I suggest that you exchange phone numbers and/or e-mail addresses with other students in the class.

Prerequisites

It is understood that students enrolled in this class will have taken at a minimum Political Science 110 (Introduction to American Politics); Political Science 200 (Political Inquiry); and Political Science 300, 310, 330, 350 or 370 (Theories of ________). Thus, I expect all students to have a working knowledge of American politics, how to write (a paper), and how to identify, apply and test theories. If you have not taken these courses, take this course after you have. Without these prerequisites, it will be more difficult to succeed in this course.

It will also be of great benefit to have taken Economics 110 or Political Science 205; and any political science course that has covered some of the subject matter (Political Science 313, 314, 315, 316, 318).

Objectives

The capstone seminar is intended to be the culminating course in the political science department. Students should bring all of the skills they have learned in previous courses and apply them to a major research project to produce the best work of their undergraduate careers.

This particular course takes as its subject matter the role of money in politics, particularly in U.S. national politics. Specifically, the course will examine how money affects elections and legislation. There are many other areas that money could affect, such as court decisions or bureaucratic decisions, but we will concentrate on elections and legislation to be able to delve deeper into these topics.

Students who complete this course successfully should:

• Understand the most important theoretical concepts in campaign finance as discussed by leading theorists;
• Learn how to apply appropriate theories to specific cases (of elections or legislation);
• Become able to organize and develop a major research study in a professional format;
• Become “experts” in a single case;
• Develop their ability to review the work of peers;
• Improve their ability to present their work (and the work of others); and
• Improve their ability to write clear and engaging prose.

Approach

The course will be conducted as a seminar. Students will rotate presenting and leading the discussion of the readings. Students who are not presenting will be required to write a short response paper about the readings and participate actively. Therefore, it is incumbent that you have read the material to be discussed during each class period prior to the class. You should anticipate that the discussion leaders and I will call on you to contribute your opinion.

I actively encourage questions, interruptions, cries for help, protests of disbelief, etc. You will never be penalized for participating--even when this takes the form of vague complaints like, "I've got no clue why we are reading this stuff!" I urge--indeed, I expect--you to take advantage of the chance to talk with me during office hours.

Requirements

Reading Responses	10%
Discussion Leading and Class Participation	10%
Prospectus	2%
Outline and Bibliography	3%
Class Presentation	5%
Poster Presentation	5%
Peer Draft	15%
Peer Reviews	10%
Final Draft	40%

Readings

We will be reading about four journal articles or book chapters each week, or about two articles/chapters in each class. In general, each topic will have readings that come to opposite (or at least different) conclusions.

Reading Responses

Before each class, you are required to send me a short email (2-3 paragraphs) for the readings for that class. The email is due at 6 a.m. the day we discuss the material. The first one or two paragraphs should explicate the arguments of the readings, including such things as independent and dependent variables and causal mechanisms; and assess the evidence, summarizing what the data are and how well they support the authors' arguments. The last paragraph needs to show your independent, critical thought, and can take (at least) one of the following four forms:

1. Intra-class connection. Example: Today’s reading reminded me of the earlier essay by….The connection I see is…Today’s author reads the evidence differently because…
2. Cross-curriculum connections. Example: Today’s reading got me thinking about a similar problem in my economics class….
3. Data connections. Example: Today’s reading implied that all politicians are corrupt, yet The New York Times today carried a story about a Senator who was retiring to spend more time with her family, calling into question the author's initial assumption….
4. Puzzlement. Example: Today’s reading discussed how special interests invest in incumbents. But we read something earlier by the same author that said that special interests were essentially uninterested in such behavior. How can these both be right?

Other means, beyond these four forms, of showing your independent thought and analysis will also be fine, provided your thoughts are organized and clearly expressed, and that you are making connections between ideas.

I will provide feedback on how you are doing on the emails at a few points in the semester, but a far better way to have them evaluated is to print them, bring them to class, and use them as the basis for our discussions. In addition, they are also a chance to explore ideas without the pressure of expanding them into full papers, though it is likely that some arguments used in great papers may will get their start as smart emails.

You should submit emails for each reading assignment every day that we have a reading assignment, except when you are leading class discussion. Each student can skip two emails without penalty. You should feel free to discuss the readings together before composing the emails. Collaboration and discussion is encouraged. However, you will be graded on your independence of thought in your analysis, so copying each other’s work will be penalized severely.

Discussion Leading and Class Participation

Two or three times during the semester, each student will have the opportunity to lead class discussion on the readings. Presenting students may wish to meet with me before presenting their readings. More details on what I expect in leading class discussion are found here. Since this class is a seminar, students should be ready to engage one another in discussion. Of course, in order to participate, one needs to attend class. Active, collaborative learning not only enhances your education, but is more interesting to both student and instructor.

Research Project

The research project determines most of the class grade. The research project for this class will be to apply theories that we read in class to a 2002 U.S. Senate Election (i.e. a case study). In short, you will analyze how money affects the particular Senate race. After showing how money affected (or not) the Senate race, you will argue whether this means that the campaign finance system should be changed, and how. In the 2002 election, there were 12 races that were decided by 10 points or less, and several more that attracted the attention of parties and interest groups. Compared to all other campaigns (except Presidential campaigns), Senate races also attract more attention of the press, so it will be (relatively) easier to track down evidence to (dis)confirm various theories. The class is set up to accomodate this research project, as many of the theories to be applied will be covered in the first half of the semester. Each student will examine a different race, and will need to choose the race within the first couple weeks.

If you want to do some other project, then you should discuss it with me as soon as possible. For example, you could apply the theories to a piece of (potential) legislation, but you would most likely need to have inside information about how (moneyed) interests affected legislation at early stages.

All assignments are due at the beginning of class. If you cannot make it to class, please leave the assignment with the department secretaries (in the Political Science office--745 SWKT) before class begins. You may also submit your assignments via email (as an attachment). I will deduct a 10 points per day (including weekends) for late papers (on a 100 point scale). That said, I am a reasonable person; if you anticipate a problem with submitting the assignment when it is due, speak to me before the assignment is due so that we can try to work out an alternative arrangement. The assignments may be picked up in the Political Science office (745 SWKT) after they are graded. The papers will be discarded at the end of the Summer 2003 term.

Prospectus

Early in the semester, you will be required to submit a research proposal or prospectus. A research prospectus is a plan of attack for a research problem. The audience for the prospectus is the instructor and your peers in the class. Each of you should meet with me one-on-one at least one week before the prospectus is due so that I can suggest useful sources, possible angles of attack, and potential problems. A quality prospectus includes the following:

1. It should clearly state a research question (which is not the same as a topic). The question should ask about relationships between variables.
2. It should apply a theoretical approach to research the question, drawing on relevant literature in political science (from this course and beyond it).
3. From that theoretical approach should stem hypotheses about relationships among independent and dependent variables. The hypotheses should point to causal relationships, e.g. if A then B. These hypotheses should be very clearly stated.
4. It should contain a discussion on where you plan to find the relevant statistical or case study data to provide evidence for your hypotheses. “I will consult political science journals” is not sufficient. You need to have a clear idea about specific sources of theoretical analysis, qualitative information and quantitative data. You do not need to discuss these sources at length, but you do need to identify them.
5. It should briefly discuss possible limitations to the research endeavor.

Outline and Bibliography

In the middle of the semester, you will turn in a more detailed outline of your paper. You should demonstrate the primary arguments of the paper, as well as support for each of those arguments. In addition, you will turn in a bibliography that shows where you are getting your information for your specific topic, as well as what theories you are applying and testing.

Class Presentation

Near the end of the semester, we will devote one week of class to students presenting their work to the rest of the class. You will have about five minutes for the presentation, so you will not have time to present your entire project. Instead, you should concentrate on one point. The point may come from the paper, or it can even be something that you found interesting about your case, but did not fit into the paper. But it should still be an analytical point that uses the theories we read. Some further suggestions for presentations can be found here and here.

Poster Presentation

At a time to be determined at the end of the semester, each student will present their research in a poster format. Poster presentations are becoming more common in many professions and are a good way to receive informal feedback from a variety of persons. The most important feature of a poster is to be legible (from a distance of, say, four feet). By necessity, a poster must also simplify arguments. More details on poster presentations can be found here, here, and here.

Peer Draft

A few weeks before the final draft is due, you will turn in a draft of your paper to your peers (and me). The peer draft should not be a first draft, or else your grade will suffer and you will not get as much helpful feedback. The peer draft does not need to incorporate the last two topics' theories (reform and business), though the final draft will need to include these (and it does not hurt to read ahead). Students will be assigned to a group of three. Each student in the group will distribute his or her paper to the other two students for peer evaluation.

The paper must include an abstract. An abstract is a terse, one-paragraph summary of the paper’s argument and evidence. It is required for most scholarly writing. It greatly helps the reader identify the main points of a paper and follow its contents. It should not be longer than 250 words.

Peer Reviews

Students will evaluate two peers' papers, and return each of them with an evaluation sheet. Peers will also give grades to the instructor only. Finally, authors will grade their peers on how well they were able to constructively criticize authors' arguments, and give specific suggestions on how to strengthen those arguments.

Final Draft

After incorporating the appropriate suggestions and criticisms, students will turn in their final paper. Remember to include an abstract. Authors will also grade the peer reviewers.

Expectations

I do not grade on a curve.

I include the following information from the BYU 2002-2003 Undergraduate Catalog which guides how I grade and determine workload:

"The grade given in a course is the teacher's evaluation of the student's performance, achievement, and understanding in that subject as covered in the class. The following adjectives indicate the meaning of the letter grades:

A	Excellent
B	Good
C	Satisfactory
D	Minimum passing
E	Unacceptable

"Hence, the grade A means that the student's performance, achievement, and understanding were excellent in the portion of the subject covered in the class.

"There are prerequisites that qualify students to be admitted to the more advanced classes offered by a department. A senior has added experience, understanding, and preparation and, consequently, progresses in courses that would have been impossible when the student was a freshman. The level of performance, achievement, and understanding required to qualify for each grade that carries credit (any grade other than E, UW, I, IE, or WE) is higher in a more advanced class than in those classes that precede it, and the student is prepared to work at this higher level" (p. 48).

"The expectation for undergraduate courses is three hours of work per week per credit hour for the average student who is appropriately prepared; much more time may be required to achieve excellence" (p. 46).

Putting these two statements together, the university expects an "average student" to work "much more" than 9 hours a week to receive an 'A' (= "excellence") in a 3 credit-hour course. This is my expectation as well.

This workload has been affirmed by President Bateman in two of his recent devotional addresses. On 7 September 1999, he stated, "It takes approximately three hours of study outside class for every hour in the classroom. If you take 15 hours of credit, you should allocate upward of 45 hours for study per week." On 19 September 2000, he advised, "Study daily--at least three hours for every hour in class."

Academic Honesty and Plagiarism

From the Academic Honesty section of the BYU Honor Code: "The first injunction of the BYU Honor Code is the call to `be honest.' Students come to the university not only to improve their minds, gain knowledge, and develop skills that will assist them in their life's work, but also to build character. `President David O. McKay taught that character is the highest aim of education' (The Aims of a BYU Education, p. 6). It is the purpose of the BYU Academic Honesty Policy to assist in fulfilling that aim.

"BYU students should seek to be totally honest in their dealings with others. They should complete their own work and be evaluated based upon that work. They should avoid academic dishonesty and misconduct in all its forms, including but not limited to plagiarism, fabrication or falsification, cheating, and other academic misconduct." Read the full version here (parts attached to the original paper syllabus).

A colleague (Professor Mitch Sanders of Notre Dame) has already explicated these issues specifically for political science. Please read here (also attached to the original paper syllabus).

If you write a paper for another course (past or present) that uses the same topic as a paper for this course, you need to approve it with me first, and then you must turn in to me a copy of the paper from your other course.

Other Notes

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination against any participant in an educational program or activity that receives federal funds. The act is intended to eliminate sex discrimination in education. Title IX covers discrimination in programs, admissions, activities, and student-to-student sexual harassment. BYU’s policy against sexual harassment extends not only to employees of the university but to students as well. If you encounter unlawful sexual harassment or gender based discrimination, please talk to your professor; contact the Equal Employment Office at 422-5895 or 367-5689 (24-hours); or contact the Honor Code Office at 422-2847.

Brigham Young University is committed to providing a working and learning atmosphere which reasonably accommodates qualified persons with disabilities. If you have any disability which may impair your ability to complete this course successfully, please contact the University Accessibility Center (422-2767). Reasonable academic accommodations are reviewed for all students who have qualified documented disabilities. Services are coordinated with the student and instructor by the UAC office. If you need assistance or if you feel you have been unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of disability, you may seek resolution through established grievance policy and procedures. You should contact the Equal Employment Office at 422-5895, D-282 ASB.

Readings

It is essential that you keep up with the reading. Indeed, I expect you to have completed reading assignments before the class in which we discuss it (thus, the response papers). There are two books available for purchase from the bookstore (also on reserve at the Lee Library):

• Jerrold E. Schneider. 2002. Campaign Finance Reform and the Future of the Democratic Party.
• Bradley A. Smith. 2001. Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform.

(You can also obtain these books through an on-line bookstore. The following websites search out several bookstores simultaneously: TextbookLand.com or AllBookStores.com or Campusbooks4less.com or StudentMarket.com.)

The vast majority of the readings are from journal articles or book chapters. These will be available for checkout (and to photocopy) in the Department of Political Science office (745 SWKT). As the office keeps regular business hours (8 a.m. - 5 p.m.), please plan ahead to obtain the readings. There will also be an opportunity to copy all of the readings (besides the two books) at once. Many of the readings may be accessed through the internet via links provided below (on a BYU computer, or off-campus, if you know how to work through the library off-campus access).

I may add or subtract readings during the semester.

Introduction (January 7-9)

• Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele. 2000. "How the Little Guy Gets Crunched." Time 155(7 February):38-41.
• Donald L. Barlett, James B. Steele, Laura Karmatz, Andrew Goldstein, and Joan Levinstein. 2000. "Soaked by Congress." Time 155(15 May):64-75.
• Donald L. Barlett, James B. Steele, Laura Karmatz, Daniel S. Levy, and Joan Levinstein. 2000. "Throwing the Game." Time 155(25 September):52-57.
• Eric Bates. 2001. "Campaign Inflation." Mother Jones, 5 March.
• Jeffrey Milyo. 1999. "The Political Economics of Campaign Finance." The Independent Review 3(4):537-547.
• Recommended
  • Laura Karmatz, Andrew Goldstein, and Joan Levinstein. 2000. "How to Become a Top Banana." Time 155(7 February):42-51.
  • Tom Hamburger, Laurie McGinley, and David S. Cloud. 2001. "Influence Market: Industries that Backed Bush are now Seeking Return on Investment." Wall Street Journal, 6 March, A1.
  • Jeff Milyo. 1997. "Money Walks: Why campaign contributions aren't as corrupting as you think." Reason (July).
  • Jeffrey Milyo. n.d. "What Does Academic Research Tell Us About the Role of Money in American Politics?" White Paper. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies.

The Campaign Finance System (January 14)

• Anthony Corrado. 2003. "Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law." In The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook, eds. Anthony Corrado, Thomas Mann, Daniel Ortiz, and Trevor Potter [Chapter 1].
• Recommended
  • Trevor Potter and Kirk L. Jowers. 2002. "Summary Analysis of Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act Passed by House and Senate and Sent to President." Brookings
  • The Campaign Finance Institute. 2002. "Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act." Campaign Finance Institute
  • Hoover Institution
  • Campaign Finance Information Center

Can Money Keep Out Challengers? (January 16-21)

• Philip L. Hersch and Gerald S. McDougall. 1994. "Campaign War Chests as a Barrier to Entry in Congressional Races." Economic Inquiry 32:630-641. [Click on "Page Image" at the bottom of the page.]
• Jay Goodliffe. 2001. "The Effect of War Chests on Challenger Entry in U.S. House Elections." American Journal of Political Science 45(4):830-844.
• Jay Goodliffe. 2002. "Campaign War Chests in Senate Elections."
• Jeffrey Milyo and Timothy Groseclose. 1999. "The Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth." Journal of Law and Economics 42(2):699-722.
• Recommended
  • Jonathan D. Salant. 1996. “Freshman’s War Chest Deters Challengers.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 24 August, 2363-2366.
  • Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier. 1996. "A Dynamic Analysis of The Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy." American Journal of Political Science 40(2):352-371.
  • Robert E. Hogan. 2001. "Campaign War Chests and Challenger Emergence in State Legislative Elections.” Political Research Quarterly 54(4):815-830.
  • Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder. 2000. “Campaign War Chests in Congressional Elections.” Business and Politics 2(1):9-33. [Click on "PDF Full Text" at the top or bottom of the page.]
  • L. Sandy Maisel and Walter J. Stone. 2001. "Primary Elections as a Deterrence to Candidacy for the U.S. House of Representatives." In Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation, eds. Peter F. Galderisi, Marni Ezra, and Michael Lyons [Chapter 3].

Can Congressional Candidates Buy an Election? (January 23-28)

• Alan Gerber. 1998. "Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables." American Political Science Review 92(2):401-411.
• Robert S. Erikson and Thomas R. Palfrey. 2000. "Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data." American Political Science Review 94(3):595-609.
• Jeffrey Milyo. 1998. The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections. Citizens’ Research Foundation.
• Jay Goodliffe and David B. Magleby. 2001. "Campaign Finance in U.S. House Primary and General Elections." In Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation, eds. Peter F. Galderisi, Marni Ezra, and Michael Lyons [Chapter 5].
• Recommended
  • Donald Philip Green and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1988. "Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections." American Journal of Political Science 32(4):884-907.
  • Gary C. Jacobson. 1990. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments." American Journal of Political Science 34(2):334-362.
  • Steven D. Levitt. 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House." Journal of Political Economy 102(4):777-798.
  • Robert S. Erikson and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1998. "Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An Alternative Simultaneous Equations Approach." Journal of Politics 60(2):355-373.

Can Parties Buy an Election? (January 30 - February 4)

• Anthony Corrado. 1997. "Party Soft Money." In Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook, eds. Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel Ortiz, Trevor Potter, and Frank Sorauf [Chapter 6].
• Ray La Raja. 2001. "Sources and Uses of Soft Money: What Do We Know?" In A User's Guide to Campaign Finance Reform, ed. Gerald C. Lubenow [Chapter 5].
• David B. Magleby and Eric. A. Smith. 2002. "Party Soft Money in the 2000 Congressional Elections." In The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections, ed. David B. Magleby [Chapter 2].
• Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2000. “Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties.” Columbia Law Review 100(3):598-619. [Click on the link, type in the title under "Search for:", and change "Date:" to "Previous five years". It will be the third document.]
• Recommended
  • Diana Dwyre. 1996. "Spinning Straw into Gold: Soft Money and U. S. House Elections." Legislative Studies Quarterly 21(3):409-424.
  • Marianne Holt. 2000. "The Surge in Party Money in Competitive 1998 Congressional Elections." In Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections, ed. David B. Magleby [Chapter 2].
  • David B. Magleby, ed. 2000. Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections. [See especially chapters 5-7, 11]
  • David B. Magleby, ed. 2002. The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections. [See especially chapters 5-12]

Can Special Interests Buy an Election? (February 6-11)

• Trevor Potter and Kirk L. Jowers. 2002. "Issue and Express Advocacy." In The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook, eds. Anthony Corrado, Thomas Mann, Daniel Ortiz, and Trevor Potter [Chapter 8].
• Anna Nibley Baker and David B. Magleby. 2002. "Interest Groups in the 2000 Congressional Elections." In The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections, ed. David B. Magleby [Chapter 3].
• David B. Magleby and Jason Richard Beal. 2002. "Independent Expenditures and Internal Communications in the 2000 Congressional Elections." In The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections, ed. David B. Magleby [Chapter 4].
• Jay Goodliffe. 2000. "The 1998 Utah Second Congressional District Race." In Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections, ed. David B. Magleby [Chapter 10].
• Recommended
  • David B. Magleby. 2000. "Interest-Group Election Ads" and "Outside Money and the Ground War in 1998." In Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections, ed. David B. Magleby [Chapters 3-4].
  • David B. Magleby, ed. 2000. Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections. [See especially chapters 5, 7-9, 11]
  • David B. Magleby, ed. 2002. The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections. [See especially chapters 5-12]

Preview: Can Special Interests Buy Legislation? (February 13)

• Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter. 1963. "Pressure Group or Service Bureau?" and "The Pressure Groups--A Summary." In American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade [Chapters 24 and 28].
• Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and Mark Weller. 1998. "Gifts: Networks of Oblication," and "Access: Loopholes as a System." In Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy [Chapters 2 and 3].

Can Presidential Candidates Buy the Nomination? (February 20-25)

• Anthony Corrado. 2000. "The Presidential Public Financing System." In Campaign Finance Reform [Chapter 5].
• Audrey A. Haynes, Paul-Henri Gurian, and Stephen M. Nichols. 1997. "The Role of Candidate Spending in Presidential Nomination Campaigns." Journal of Politics 59(1):213-225.
• Randall E. Adkins and Andrew J. Dowdle. 2002. "The Money Primary: What Influences the Outcome of Pre-Primary Presidential Nomination Fundraising?" Presidential Studies Quarterly 32(2):256-275. [Click on "Open in New Window", then "article availability", then "display PDF".]
• David F. Damore. 1997. "A dynamic model of candidate fundraising: The case of presidential nomination campaigns." Political Research Quarterly 50(2):343-364.
• Recommended
  • Barbara Norrander. 1993. "Nomination Choices: Caucus and Primary Outcomes, 1976-88." American Journal of Political Science 37(2):343-364.
  • Diana C. Mutz. 1995. "Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries." Journal of Politics 57(4):1015-1042.
  • Katherine A. Hinckley and John C. Green. 1996. "Fund-Raising in Presidential Nomination Campaigns: The Primary Lessons of 1988." Political Research Quarterly 49(4):693-718.
  • Gordon S. Hanson. 2000. "Out of cash: U.S. presidential pre-nominations." Party Politics 6(1): 47-59.

Can Special Interests Buy Legislation? (February 27 - March 13)

• Stephen G. Bronars and John R. Lott, Jr. 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?" Journal of Law and Economics 50(2):317-350.
• Thomas Stratmann. 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation." Journal of Law and Economics 45(2):345-373.
• Stephen Ansolabehere, John de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?" Journal of Economic Perspectives (forthcoming).
• Fred S. McChesney. 1997. "Introduction," "Background: The Economic Theory of Regulation," "Rent Extraction: The Theory of Political Extortion," "Observing Extortion: The Practice of Rent Extraction," and "Validating the Model: Empirical Tests of Rent Extraction." In Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion [Introduction, Chapters 1-4].
• Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." American Political Science Review 84(3):797-820.
• John R. Wright. 1990. "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives." American Political Science Review 84(2):417-438.
• David P. Baron. 1989. "Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium." Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(1):45-72.
• James M. Snyder, Jr. 1992. "Long-term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often." Journal of Law and Economics 35(1):15-43.
• Nolan McCarty and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 1996. "Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract." American Journal of Political Science 40(3):872-904.
• Thomas Stratmann. 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?" Journal of Law and Economics 41(1):85-114.
• Recommended
  • Stephen Moore, Sidney M. Wolfe, Deborah Lindes, and Clifford E. Douglas. 1994. "Epidemiology of Failed Tobacco Control Legislation." Journal of the American Medical Association 272:1171-1175.
  • John R. Wright. 1998. "Tobacco Industry PACs and the Nation's Health: A Second Opinion." In The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington, eds. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox [Chapter 11].
  • James M. Snyder, Jr. 1990. "Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986." Journal of Political Economy 98(6):1195-1227.
  • Thomas Stratmann. 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?" Review of Economics and Statistics 77(1):127-136.
  • Jeffrey Milyo, David Primo, David, and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. "Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective." Business and Politics 2(1):75-88. [Click on "PDF Full Text" at the top or bottom of the page.]
  • Elizabeth Drew. 1997. Whatever It Takes.
  • Darrell M. West and Burdett A. Loomis. 1999. The Sound of Money: How Political Interests Get What They Want.

Class Presentations (March 18-20)

Can/Should the Campaign Finance System Be Reformed? (March 25 - April 8)

• Jerrold E. Schneider. 2002. Campaign Finance Reform and the Future of the Democratic Party.
• Bradley A. Smith. 2001. Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform.
• Recommended
  • Darrell M. West. 2000. Checkbook Democracy: How Money Corrupts Political Campaigns.
  • David Donnelly, Janice Fine, and Ellen S. Miller. 1999. Money and Politics: Financing Our Elections Democratically.
  • Michael J. Malbin and Thomas L. Gais. 1998. The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the American States.
  • Diana Dwyre and Victoria A. Farrar-Myers. 2001. Legislative Labyrinth: Congress and Campaign Finance Reform.
  • Justin A. Nelson. 2000. "The Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform. Columbia Law Review 100(2):524-557. [Click on the link, type in the title under "Search for:", and change "Date:" to "Previous five years". It will be the first document.]

Does Business Rule? (April 10-15)

• Thomas Ferguson. 1995. "Party Realignment and American Industrial Structure: The Investment Theory of Political Parties in Historical Perspective," "Deduced and Abandoned: Rational Expectations, the Investment Theory of Political Parties, and the Myth of the Median Voter," and "Money and Destiny in Advanced Capitalism: Paying the Piper, Calling the Tune." In Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems [Chapter 1, Appendix, Conclusion].
• Mark A. Smith. 1999. "Public Opinion, Elections, and Representation within a Market Economy: Does the Structural Power of Business Undermine Popular Sovereignty?" American Journal of Political Science 43(3):842-863.
• Recommended
  • Charles Lindblom. 1977. Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems.
  • G. William Domhoff. 2001. Who Rules America? Power and Politics, 4th ed.
  • Jeffrey M. Berry. 1999. The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups.
  • David Vogel. 1989. Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America.

Bonus Topic: Can Special Interests Buy Court Decisions?

• Joseph F. Kobylka. 1987. "A Court-Created Context for Group Litigation: Libertarian Groups and Obscenity." Journal of Politics 49(4):1061-1078.
• Lee Epstein and C. K. Rowland. 1991. "Debunking the Myth of Interest Group Invincibility in the Courts." American Political Science Review 85(1):205-217.
• Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright. 1988. "Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court." American Political Science Review 82(4):1109-1127.

Schedule (subject to change)

References

Many parts of this syllabus are drawn from Bert Johnson's syllabus. I also consulted the last three years of department capstone seminar syllabi, and used some parts of those syllabi verbatim.

Political Science 410/430 home page

Jay Goodliffe's home page

This page is http://fhss.byu.edu/polsci/Goodliffe/410/syllabus.htm